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1. Introduction
In academic arena, people got used to formal governance as it is common in everyday politics. 
However, its informal counterpart has momentum among few scholars that brings about some 
dif ficulties in understanding their dif ference.  This study explores the concept of governance 
throughout some existing literature.  It shows different interpretations of the concept introduced by 
various scholars, dictionaries and leading international institutions or organizations.  The examination 
of various meaning leads to the clarification of the definition of governance concept.  In fact, the 
important elements are highlighted and various models of thinking about governance are explored.
　 Clarifying formal and informal governance concepts, it is necessary to grasp what governance or 
formal governance is or entails.  The starting point is that there exists a relation between informal and 
formal governance.  Indeed, the informal governance works always in the context of formal 
governance.  For this reason, it is important to understand the formal governance concept.
　 In fact, the discussion on formal governance is important because it is difficult to grasp informal 
governance without understanding the formal one.  Then, the next section attempts to explore and 
conceptualize informal governance.  Indeed, the emphasis on governance led many scholars to pay 
attention to non-formal aspects of governance.  As many scholars found that the existing literature on 
informal governance was scattered, they tried to bring those studies together to provide a clarification 
of informal governance concept in making a single conceptual frame to the different studies.  At the 
last point, alongside other scholars, I attempt to conceptualize the African traditional authorities as 
informal governance.  Let us start by understanding what formal governance entails.
2. Formal Governance
2.1 Understanding the Governance Concept
The English verb ‘govern’ derives from Latin ‘gubernare’ meaning ‘steer, direct, rule’.  Then, this latin 
word ‘gubernare’ derives from the Greek kubernan, meaning ‘steer’.  In addition, many nouns have 
their roots from this verb such as governance, government, governor, governability, and cybernetics.
　 Among those noun derivations, this study concern resides on governance.  However, there is a 
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variety of definitions concerning the word governance.  This leads to the understanding that there is 
no agreement on one meaning of governance from social scientists, dictionaries, leading institutional 
and international organizations.  For instance, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary provides threes 
meaning of governance: one meaning refers to the action, manner, or fact of governing; government, 
as well as controlling or regulating influence; control, mastery.  Another meaning is the function of or 
power of governing; authority to govern.  The third meaning refers to conduct of life or business; 
behavior.  Among the social scientists, Guy Peter and Jon Pierre refer to governance as its 
capacity -unlike government- to cover the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the 
process of governing.  It is the capacity of the government to make and implement policy i. e. to steer 
society [Pierre and Peters 2000: 1].  Among various leading international institutions, UNDP defines 
governance as the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s 
affairs at all levels.  It encompasses mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens 
and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate 
their differences [UNDP 1997: 2―3].
It is important to note that in the above mentioned and all varied definitions, the leading institutions 
and studies converge on the terms of structures or institutions and processes by which power is 
exercised.  Besides, various forms of governance exist such as global, regional, state, corporate 
governance.  In this study, the focus is on the state governance.
　 Then, it is necessary to explore the key words ‘structures or institutions and process’ that play a 
paramount role in governance.  In the contemporary political science and economics literature, there 
are different ways of thinking about governance and its different definitions.  From the past until the 
present, there exist four common governance arrangements such as hierarchies, markets, networks, 
and communities.  These four elements refer to governance as structure.
2.2 Governance as Structure
The discussion on governance as structure assumes that a variety of political and economic 
institutions existed in the past to address the problems of governance.  Each institution played a role 
in providing direction to society and giving solution to some governance problems in its manner but 
also each model of governance has its weaknesses.  Bound in cultural and temporal terms, their 
effectiveness not only depended on the places and times but also did not resolve all problems.
2.2.1 Hierarchical Governance
This is an idealized model that conducted governance in western advanced democratic countries 
through vertically integrated state structure.  This model emphasized the Weberian form of public 
service and used the law as key instrument to dominate and control society.  In addition, this model 
set apart public-private sectors.  Similarly, it separated state and society, but the state could govern the 
society through imposition of law and other regulations.  Thus, hierarchy characterized the state’s 
interaction with society as well as its internal organization and way of operation.  As it can be 
observed, this model of governance fell short to bridge public-private border to contribute to the 
resolution of more problems in the society.
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　 However, hierarchical governance persists and has influence in many national and international 
contexts.  Hierarchies remain dominant in many systems of governance.  They provide some 
advantages.  Their clear structures facilitate accountability where each official knows his position and 
responsibility.  They use a permanent and neutral form of expertise within institutions as a counter to 
party bias [Bevir 2009: 59].
　 The current governance literature formulates many critics toward this model of governance.  These 
critics have mentioned flaws and limitations of hierarchical bureaucracies.  They are qualified as 
inefficient, inflexible, and unresponsive.  They are inefficient because of their lack of incentives 
structure that characterize the markets.  They are inflexible due to the presence of many layers, “each 
of which must be kept in the loop and perhaps even agree to decisions made at lower tiers: they put a 
premium on abiding by organizational rules and norms rather than innovation and entrepreneurial 
activity” [Bevir 2009: 59].  They are unresponsive because they do not try to fulfil the expectations of 
citizens or consumers.  But exhort officials to concentrate on practicing rules and accomplishing the 
intentions of their higher authorities.
　 Another important argument against hierarchies is the state-driven decentralization in the advanced 
democracies.  This concerns the transfer of more effective autonomy to the cities and regions at the 
expense of the state.  Sub national governments are shifting to the adequate way of political 
organization in the post powerful state society.
　 Another point is about state’s control reduction.  This declension of state’s control is due to the 
decreasing resource base of the state and the changes in the state’s external environment.  In addition, 
globalization of financial and other markets contributes to the dismissal of hierarchical model. 
Globalization allowed the state to initiate transnational institutions and organizations to exercise 
effective control over deregulated markets.  These transnational institutions diminish nation-state 
sovereignty and autonomy.  Nevertheless, Pierre and Peters suggest this reduction to be understood 
as ‘strategies of state to reassert control’ [Pierre and Peters 2009: 16].
2.2.2 Governance as Markets
This model of governance is not only the opposite but also the alternative of the hierarchical model. 
Its popular acceptance is due to its capacity to bring the solution to more problems.  Market is 
expected to be different from the big government and the most efficient with just available allocation 
mechanism.  Markets also play a role in empowering citizens.  Here, elected officials have no longer a 
final say on what services the state should provide.  The change is that consumers could choose 
directly what public services can be available to them.  Hence, the public has a final decision on public 
services.
　 It is better to understand the relationship between markets and governance in terms of market 
governance and governance by market.  The former refers to the “rules and institutions by which a 
state governs the operation of market” [Bevir 2009: 125].  The state’s central goal is to ensure the 
competitiveness of markets.  It must exchange goods and services at price levels in such a way that 
the utility of consumers is optimized, and the profits of the providers are maximized.  While 
governance by market has to do with efficient mechanism in which market allocate goods and 
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services.  States are often called market economies when they are use as ways of supplying goods and 
delivering services.
　 Social scientists highlight the following three main approaches to the study of market [Bevir 2009: 
126―127].  Neoclassical economics refer to market as the most efficient mechanism for the distribution 
of goods and ser vices.  The aim of this approach is to determine market inef ficiencies and 
restructuring market governance to eliminate these inefficiencies.  For neoliberals, the cause of 
inef ficiency is government intervention.  This intervention hampers communication between 
producers and consumers.  Thus, neoliberals beseech for the reduction of government regulation and 
the introduction of markets and its mechanisms.  On the other hand, welfare economists advocate for 
government intervention for market to be efficient.
　 The new institutional economics approach provides an alternative model to the market and 
emphasizes on rules and regulatory organizations as crucial for the function of market.  They mention 
the role of institutions to ensure the protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts. 
Finally, political economy seeks to understand how political decisions have effects on the operation of 
market.  Here market is seen as mechanism for allocating resources among groups in society.
　 The criticisms of hierarchy inspired neoliberals who attempt to use markets to reform public sector. 
As mentioned above, “adequate functioning markets ought to provide an efficient distribution of 
resources as well as to be responsive to individual demands” [Bevir 2009: 59].  There are many goods 
for which markets cannot properly function due to the absence of competition or information, the 
presence of a monopoly or transaction costs.  Indeed, it is difficult to build public goods for properly 
functioning markets.
2.2.3 Governance as Networks
This is a contemporary form of governance.  Its function increased gradually as neoliberalism started 
losing confidence.  The rise of networks was to foster new types of partnership among state 
institutions and organized interest actors.  Networks play the role of coordination of public and private 
interests and resources in order to improve efficiency in the implementation of public policy [Benson 
1982: 148; Rhodes 1997: 51; Pierre and Peters 2009: 20; Osborne 2010: 305].
　 In the ‘new governance’, Networks supervise policy sectors with regards to actors’ preferences 
than public policy consideration.  Such governance brings about several significant consequences. 
One of them is that the interest of self-referential actors is detrimental to that of collective interest in 
Public policy.  When the state initiates the change in policy, networks can obstruct it.  Then, networks 
take control of the policy sector; meanwhile citizens hold the state accountable for what happen in the 
sector.  In this way, networks hinder democratic process by separating control and responsibility.  In 
addition, the relationship between networks and the state must be marked by mutual dependence. 
For the state, networks embody expertise and interest representations are potential components in 
policy process.  Then, networks as a common interest challenge the interest of the state.
　 Institutionalists agreed with neoliberals’ argument on the facts that bureaucratic hierarchies are 
inflexible and unresponsive as one of the critics mentioned above against hierarchical governance. 
Then institutionalists give a positive aspect to networks as flexible and responsive structures that 
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provide a conducive, structured, and yet informal environments in which social actors can operate. 
Furthermore, institutionalists are critical to markets in the extent of denying to it the source of 
competitiveness and efficiency.  Then, competitiveness and efficiency might be based on “relationships 
characterized by mutual trust, social participation, voluntary associations, and even friendship ... 
networks combine a facilitative leadership with greater flexibility, creativity, inclusiveness and 
commitment” [Bevir 2011: 362].
　 From a related perspective, network can be viewed as the practical manifestation of participatory or 
deliberative democracy in governance structures, where the direct involvement of citizens and 
community organizations as networks can potentially improve public sector legitimacy [Chambers 
2003].
　 The reliance on networks in ‘new governance’ can be explained by the difficulties encountered by 
market in public goods.  However, networks also show some weaknesses.  They can undermine 
democratic values such as reduction of control and accountability in making central steering difficult. 
Then, network actors can protect their autonomy and to possess little ownership of system policies. 
Furthermore, the central state then stops short at its inability to command and control them in having 
facilitated the rise of networks.  In these conditions, “the hands-off management and diplomacy of 
network actors is soon challenged by the center trying yet again to impose a command operating 
code” [Bevir 2009: 60].  Some protagonists of networks affirm the fact that they are not always 
adequate and suggest that state must rely on a combination of hierarchies, markets, and networks, 
adopting any organizational model that fit any given situation.  Although other critics acknowledge the 
benefits of networks, they point out to the fact that networks can lead to fragmentation and complex 
system of governance.  In so doing, the state can lose its ability to implement public policies 
effectively.
2.2.4 Governance as Communities
This model of governance brings about a debate concerning the socio-economic homogeneity and 
common interests.  The idea lies on the assumption that communities should solve their common 
problems with a minimum of state support in the areas like caring of children and elderly.  In a broad 
sense, “communitarian governance builds on a consensual image of the community and the positive 
involvement of its members in collective matters” [Pierre and Peters 2009: 21].  This statement 
indicates how community is well versed to deal with these matters than the state or local government. 
Communitarians point out on the rise of government as instrument for the management of political 
struggle in encouraging such conflicts that are not controversial.  Therefore, communitarians think 
that government generates many problems than it can solve.  For this reason, they suggest the 
organization of governance without government.
　 It can be understood that communitarian governance appears to resolve common problems without 
large public bureaucracies’ involvement.  This shows the emergence of political theory as the third 
position between the state and the market.  At the same time, community governance dismisses both 
models of governance.
　 This aspect of community’s potential accomplishment is simple and philanthropic.  Communitarians 
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think that individuals can make personal sacrifices to the common good, but it is not the case. 
Considering all consensual virtues, communitarianism inclines to exaggerate the achievements of 
consensus and the evil of disagreement; conflicts over specific issues must not be negative but rather 
positive for the benefit of the community.
Some authors like Pilora and McKinlay give another closer view on community governance.  They 
consider community governance as good collaboration between public, private and non-profit sectors 
to achieve desired outcomes for jurisdiction be it a neighborhood or a whole local government area. 
Then, there is a change of focus for government in moving from the delivery of specified services to 
the development of creative solutions to af ford community needs.  Like networks, community 
governance is more about collective processes of a wide range of players [Pilora and McKinlay 2011: 
11].
　 In this model of governance, the advocacy encourages the need to move from governing 
organizations to governing communities.  In this way, the focus will be no more on the traditional 
practice of a prescribed number of public services but on the wellbeing of local communities.  Some of 
advocates like Stewart and Clark emphasize on the wellbeing of local community as the main goal for 
community governance.  Then, community governance is conceived as networked governance which 
can apply at all levels of the government.
　 Critics of community governance argue that communities cannot be trusted to act ‘responsibly’ i. e. 
either competently or fairly.  Some authors like Taylor and Lowndes denounce the dark side of 
community like its racism, insularity, exclusion of the other.
2.3 Dynamics Aspects of Governance
The above-mentioned ways of thinking about governance emphasized the impact of structures and 
institutions.  Some assumptions, as Pierre and Peters put them, assert that if you want to get 
governance right you need to manipulate the structures.  The alternative assumption lies on the fact 
that governance is a dynamic outcome of social and political actors [Pierre and Peters 2009: 21].
2.3.1 Governance as Process.
In the dynamic view, Governance approach focuses more on process and outcome than on formal 
institutional arrangements.  The rationale behind is that governance with its contextual approach 
considers outcomes than institutions.  However, institutional arrangements cannot be neglected 
because they determine several roles that the state plays in governance.  It is significant to think about 
governance in a process view because it is not so much about structures but interconnections between 
structures.  Then, governance is expected to be dynamic in relation with both configuration and 
objectives: “the inclusion and influence of different actors could well change over time and across 
sectors” [Pierre and Peters 2009: 22].
　 The experiment of new models of policy consultation can be considered as an alternative to the 
policy process.  This includes citizen participation in policy deliberation process, reliance on 
consultation and websites where individuals can express their views on public policy.  In addition, 
traditional models of interest representation become weak as result of fiscal crisis of the state.  For 
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these reasons, it is essential to think about governance as dynamic process.
2.3.2 Governance as Steering
The current research in governance emphasizes the concept of governance as ‘steering’.  Governance 
in its etymological origin, as stated above, derives from Latin verb ‘gubernare’ meaning to steer or 
control.  So, the concept of steering society has power and still relevant in theories of governance.
　 However, two related issues emerge in steering or controlling society.  The first one concerns the 
argument of governance perspective on the ability of states in steering society, then the problem 
arises when its authority is not based on law, its control over critical resources and essence of the 
collective interest.  The second question is about the purposes.  Do states steer towards what 
objective? Taking into consideration the relationship between the actors involved in governance as the 
main concern, much of the governance literature has been quiet on who defines the objectives of 
governance.
2.3.3 Governance as Coordination
There are two views concerning the relationship between governance and coordination.  Sometimes, 
governance means coordination of a sector of the economy or industry [Hollingsworth et al., 1994] 
and sometimes, to the process through which the government seeks to control the economy [Gamble 
2000].  Besides, as a dynamic perspective, governance seeks to understand how actors, public and 
private, control economic activities and produce desired outcomes.  Considering Peter and Pierre 
analysis, both views consider government playing a “central role in producing economic outcomes and 
helping to manage the tensions of modern economies in the global environment.” [Pierre and Peters 
2009: 23].
　 Coordination plays an important role in policy process.  As it is not easier for policy actors to 
implement policies by themselves, they do so in relying on coordination among different actors in the 
policy process.  The purpose of this coordination is to pursue a common result or seek to produce it in 
collaboration.  Coordination can be said to be a driving force of governance when actors organize their 
actions.  At the same time, it is the goal of governance when policy actors establish coordination with 
purpose of making easier the policy process and public services operations.
　 In the context of new governance, coordination is framed around hierarchy, markets, and network. 
It is a shift from hierarchical coordination to markets and especially networks.  In hierarchy, 
coordination is power or authority where actors from the top have power to command those below 
them by law, reason, and charisma.  Coordination in market is price.  The allocation of resources 
among different actors depends on what they are willing to pay for a quantity of that resource.  Market 
also must lead to competitive equilibrium where consumers maximize utility and producers maximize 
profit [Bevir 2009: 58].  Networks coordination can emerge when actors have a common goal, are 
unable to realize that goal on their own, have many resources that can contribute to the collective 
realization of the goal, communicate and exchange information with one another and have trust or 
confidence in one another [Bevir 2009: 58].
　 Taking into considerations all the varied ways of defining and thinking about governance, in this 
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study, governance refer to the capacity to manage structural and institutional relationships and 
processes implicated in the exercise of power and control in society.  It is important to understand the 
distinction between the formal and informal governance.
3. Informal Governance
3.1 Clarification and Definition of Informal Governance
Starting by the word ‘informal’, it is acknowledged that informal adjective is attached to a variety of 
terms including politics, arrangements, networks, institutions, organizations, norms, rules, activity, or 
influence.  All these terms embody the capacity to be informal.  The concept is used differently by 
various authors.  Broadly speaking, three usages are considered as informal: one refers to institutions, 
organizations, networks where decisions are taken.  The second points to politics, arrangements, 
activity identified as process through which policies are made.  And the third one considers rules, 
norms and influence as process that help to make a classification of outcome.
　 After this clarification, it is necessary to understand how some scholars define the concept of 
informal governance.  Scholars like Helmke and Levitsky define ‘informal institutions as socially 
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside the officially 
sanctioned channels’ [2004: 727].  Christiansen and others of fer a slight distinct definition in 
considering ‘governance as informal when participation in the decision-making process is not yet or 
cannot be codified and publicly enforced’ [2003: 6].  Hash brings about a variation when he asserts 
that ‘informal governance refers to a means of decision-making that is uncodified, non-institutional, 
and where social relationships and webs of influence play crucial roles but it also includes decision-
making led by, or occurring entirely within NGOs at all levels’ [Christiansen et al 2012: 4].  It is worth 
to observe that dealing with informal governance, the authors operate with a few key terms like non-
codified, non-governmental, non-sanctioned.  At the same time, they demonstrate the fact that there is 
a relationship between informal arrangements and state institutions in a certain degree.
　 Although many forms of governance exist, following the theory of neo-institutional research, 
institutions as structures limit the scope of possible actions.  This includes both formal and informal 
institutional actions.  Then informal governance can be conceived in two ways.  First, informal 
governance includes actions which are not conceived by formal rules.  This means that formal rules 
allow actions besides them; either the formal rules are not followed totally, or they are limited. 
Second, informal governance is based upon the assumption that the form of governance rests on both 
formal and informal institutions.  However, the actions beside the formal rules are not undefined, but 
are also designed by rules which are now informal.  Then, informal governance in that perspective as 
an authoritative form of steering and coordination by private and state actors is based on formal and 
informal institutions.  As informal institutions possess enormous importance and cannot be ignored, it 
is better to consider the emphasis on this understanding of informal governance.
　 Considering informal institutions with the understanding of informal governance, it is important to 
understand institutions as they are used with both formal and informal adjectives.  Beginning by 
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institutions, some scholars agree and refer to them as larger and more complex constellations of social 
practices and rules of behavior [March and Olson 1989; Young 1990; Finnemore and Sikking 1998: 
891; Henrich and White 2001; Leigh Raymond et al., 2013: 6].  In the literature, most of political 
scientists have focused on formal institutions as constellations of explicit, official rules created and 
enforced by governments and other deliberately structured organizations like corporations, 
foundations, and churches.  Then, informal institutions, by contrast, refer to the sets of rules that exist 
outside and alongside formal structures of government to organize social behavior in some domain 
[Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727; Chudek and Henrich 2011].
　 Considering formal and informal institutions from the same theoretical perspective, a neo-
institutionalist approach is chosen to define institutions.  Then, the term institution is understood as a 
norm or set of norms, which have a significant impact on the behavior of individuals.  The following 
criterion serves as an appropriate point of departure to characterize formal and informal institutions. 
This criterion makes a difference between formal and informal institutions as Lauth [2012: 47] set it 
without demarcating from above mentioned scholars’ opinion.  Informal institutions refer to those 
institutions that are not formally codified in official documents like constitutions.  In contrary, formal 
institutions are officially codified in written documents.  While state agencies guarantee formal 
institutions, the state sanctions their disapproval; most of the informal institutions are based solely on 
the fact of their existence and of their effectiveness.  Informal institutions are equally known and 
recognizable by the public, but they are unwritten.
It is clear that formal rules like laws and public policies are important, at the same time empirical 
research has proved that informal rules can have greater influence on human behavior, including 
forms of corporation important to citizenship and democracy [Helmke and Levitsky, 2006; Ostrom 
1998; Leigh et al., 2013: 2]
3.2 The Difference between Formal and Informal Structures and Processes
There are rules instituted legally in defined contexts that regulate formal social performance.  Those 
rules that are written down and recognized legally constitute formal rules.  Actors, who are in charge 
in the state, can change these rules under defined and limited conditions.  In contrary, informal 
processes are social linkages that happen in formal contexts following the mechanisms that work in 
daily life.  These social linkages may unify participants into stable expectations through unwritten 
agreement.
　 Unlike formal rules, actors rely on these stable informal expectations to plan and coordinate 
individual and collective action.  When these expectations are not achieved, it can lead to 
disappointment or confusion.  Concerning sanctions, the violation of formal rules will correspond to 
formally defined sanctions while the infraction of informal normative expectations will call for 
reactions classified from polite disapprobation to social isolation or physical aggression as Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) display it.  Informal rules defined the adequacy of sanctions.
　 According to its mechanisms, informal social behavior functions like part of daily social life.  It 
makes sense when it is isolated as a special topic in the context of formal structures like organizations 
and enterprises.  In contrary, informal social interconnections not only function inside the formal 
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structures, but they also have a considerable influence on those formal structures.  It cannot be fair to 
look on formal structures from the written and legally approved form, it is also important to discover 
some of its hidden important functioning features.  This open the way for empirical research on 
informal structures and processes to help to reconstruct institutions and organizations in a formal and 
realistic manner.  On the other hand, the function of informal structures can be understood only in 
consideration of their formal environment.  Then, where can derive the source of informal institutions 
authority?
3.3 Sources of Informal Institutions’ Authority
Their authority, as Lauth [2012: 48] explains, is based on various sources.
　 First, informal institutions receive a social acceptance as the source of their legitimacy.  One key 
factor of this acceptance shaped by institutions results from the purpose they conceive.  These 
purposes can be linked to outputs as well as to certain patterns of behavior.
　 Second, unlike formal institutions that get legitimacy either from the state and people in a 
democratic election, informal institutions are based auto-licensing referring to self-enactment and 
subsequent self-assertion.  While some actors can shape and change the nature of formal institutions, 
it is not the case in informal institutions where they develop indigenously and have no center that 
direct and coordinate their actions.
　 Third, at the macro level, institutions create social phenomenon, but they cannot be understood 
without their individual basis.  On the micro level, informal norms exist only if they are accepted and 
rooted in the beliefs and/ or attitudes of individuals.  This recognition of informal norms is not 
mandatory based on a positive normative appraisal.  The essential point for informal institution is to 
function.  It does not matter if it is legal or illegal and good or bad.  This leads to say that before being 
accepted by the society, informal institutions are primarily found in the individuals’ beliefs and 
attitudes.  If informal institutions are not present in the individuals’ beliefs, then they do not exist. 
This depicts the invisible character of informal institutions.
　 Fourth, an act of state authority can change solely formal institutions and those changes can take a 
long process due to their roots in the society.  Despite their unofficial nature, informal institutions can 
be understood as the manifestation of specific functioning logics and rules of identity different from 
others.  A complementary viewpoint is expressed about “systems that possess clear dif ference 
between internal and external perception of actors as well as in terms of the types and density of 
interactions, not simply with statistical aggregates” [Zintl 1993: 89].
3.4 Types of Informal Institutions
There is a statement that asserts that “informality is an integral part of every political system” [Lauth 
2012: 51].  The statement is accepted as a descriptive assumption as well as normative orientation. 
Some authors consider political system, based only on formal rules, as a negative utopia or perfection. 
This can be also applied to informal institutions.  However, is there any need for informal institution? 
May be the important question is to know what kind of informal institution is useful for what purpose. 
For this reason, it is necessary to reveal different ways of thinking about informal institutions as it is 
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done around formal institutions in political science.  Nevertheless, the task is limited only on those 
informal institutions that can be connected to informal governance.
　 There is a variety of informal institutions in political science.  Then, it is better to make categories 
to structure political informal institutions.  Looking at the literature, there are many examples of 
informal institutions in social science.  Below are some of them provided by Hans- Joachim Lauth 
[2012: 50―54]
　 Some informal institutions are marked by a high level of abstraction such as trust and distrust.  The 
existence of such basic norms has a considerable effect on behavior in various areas.  Other informal 
institutions are related to special occasions or express a very specific meaning in certain situations. 
Beyond that behavior as embedded within that context, such informal institutions have no relevance. 
On this form, the illustration can be the typical form of salute in Germany’s totalitarian Third Reich 
that imposed a way of greetings to civilians.  Another type is a middle-range sphere such as informal 
right systems or corruption.  These are more specific than the first type and cover a broader domain 
of action than the second.
　 The distinction between informal and formal institutions can reside on their level of aggregation. 
For example, a constitution can, be understood as one single institution, although it contains several 
different rules which on their own can also be recognized separately as informal rules.  This can also 
be utilized in the domain of rule of law and the market.  Both demonstrate institutions on a high level 
of collection, which encompasses subtypes as well as variety of specific rules.  Aggregated institutions 
can be observed as abstract institutions in the sense that they are not specific and cover a broad range 
of actions.
　 Informal institutions like clientelism or corruption have characteristics of both abstract and 
aggregated institutions.  They are abstract due to their usage by various actions which are not specific 
by the general understanding of the institutions.  On the other, they include distinct subtypes, each of 
them with a more specific connotation.  The case of clientelism can be an example.  The concept of 
clientelism embodies forms of interaction which results from a specific, personally differentiated 
relationship, and which are obligated to fixed roles and dominance structures.  Clientelism is a 
‘specialist term for forms of protective relationships of mutual benefit between a person or persons 
occupying a higher place in the social hierarchy (patron) and a follower concerned with protection 
and the acquisition of certain advantages (clients)’ according to Manfred Schmidt [1995: 476].  This 
leads to understand clientelist structures as established relationship of exchange and forms of 
participation, even when the personal interactions have an asymmetrical structure.  In this relationship 
the patron controls the relationship and clients accept the patron’s authority.
　 Corruption is another paramount form of informal institution.  This is an influence structure of 
informal participation.  Then, the starting point is the understanding of the term corruption.  This 
term refer to ‘violation of an obligation by a decision-maker, in order to obtain an extra-positional 
private benefit from the agent who bribes or is being extorted, in exchange for benefits granted to the 
briber or the extor ted whose value exceeds the cost of the bribe or extor ted amount or 
service’[Garzon Valdes 1997: 109].  The occurrence of corruption in political domain (political 
corruption) has a precondition that is the involvement of the holder of public office within the political 
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system [Heidenheimer et al., 1989; Heywood 1997].  The definition encloses two basic forms of 
corruption when considering the different directions their respective influences take.  On the one 
hand, the official checks out the influence of societal actors upon political decisions by means of 
material contributions (bribe).  On the other, he/she find out financial requests made by state 
employees upon citizens, without which the former would not be prepared to fulfill their obligatory 
duties (extortion).  Aggregated institutions like clientelism and corruption shape common patterns 
illustrating informal institutions at a high level of abstraction, which can reach the level of a hidden 
constitution.  Clientelism and corruption can structure a system of rent-seeking.
　 Customary law, which is compatible with the rule of law, is another form of informal institution. 
However, some forms of custom can be incompatible with the rule of law.  Customary law contains all 
non-codified rules and modes of behavior, which are actionable (ready to be put into action) before 
state or private tribunals as Lauth [2012: 54] expresses it.  Customary law encompasses traditional 
secular and religious law systems.  This is a very broad sphere with many subdivisions.  Several are 
compatible with or in tension or contradict the central principle of the rule of law.  For instance, Folk 
traditions are part of customary law, many people are attached to them and those laws are enforced in 
non-state or even partially state-controlled tribunals, they can be found in the world, especially in 
Africa.  There have been new developments in some areas like business relations, where private 
entities carry out conflict arbitration by their own created business law.  Another new area is 
neighborhood networks where informal law systems have been used to regulate specific aspects of 
social security (self-help networks, saver and migrant clubs, or burial societies).  All these networks 
can be observed mostly in developing countries.
　 Concerning self-help networks, it is important to say that they are informal institutions due to their 
correspondence to arrangements made under the rule of law.  A democracy theory’s view qualifies 
self-help networks to be able of making positive inputs, as they enable the practice as well as the 
practicing of democratic modes of behavior (Tocqueville), while simultaneously defusing problem 
situations in the social sphere.
3.5 Conceptualizing Traditional Authorities as Informal Institutions
Traditional chieftaincies and kingdoms are based on norms and customs that rule the societies. 
These chieftaincies and kingdoms function in some parts of the world.  Even if they are found in the 
same country, region, continent; their mode of operation differs from one village to another.  For this 
reason, some authors tried to conceptualize them according to their political set up and system.  Below 
are few of them.
　 Sangita Yadav [2012: 3] considered traditional Panchayat (organized system of rural local self-
government in Nepal) as ‘Informal local governance system’ (ILGS).  The rationale resides on the 
fundamental role it plays in local rural governance and the deep impact it has in rural area.  In 
addition, ILGS is rooted in traditions, norms and customs, values, religions that govern the societies. 
People rely on this system for the solution of issues and disputes or any other concerned activities 
related to social needs.  Thus, informal governance plays a role for maintaining law and order in rural 
area of Nepal.
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　 Kripa AnanthPur [2004: 2], in his study on village panchayats (councils) in India, labeled these 
panchayats as ‘Informal local governance institutions’ (ILGIs).  These are inter-caste institutions that 
enforce not only traditional rules and norms but also perform a range of useful collective functions at 
the village, in a consensual manner.  AnanthPur came to this label because panchayats have a wide 
variety of local names in India.  He thought that generic labels may be controversial, as they may be 
red as implying a particular interpretation of these organizations particularly the words like 
‘traditional’ and ‘informal’.  In so doing, the author wanted to be as neutral as possible in using ILGIs 
to qualify those various village panchayats.
　 Economic Commission for Africa [2007: 3] labeled the pre- and post-colonial political systems in 
Africa as ‘African traditional institutions of governance’.  This is because the chiefs, kings or monarchs 
are considered as custodians of “a set of customs passed down over generation and a set of beliefs and 
values endorsing those customs” [Fleischacker, 1994: 45].  These political systems were having two-
fold system of governance.  Decentralized system with law-making, social control and allocation of 
resources carried out by local entities such as lineage groupings, village communities and age sets. 
These systems were largely based on consensual decision-making arrangements that varied from one 
place to another [ECA 2007: 3].  And in other parts of Africa, centralized systems were established 
with kings and monarchs.  The level of centralization and concentration of power in the hands of the 
leaders varied from place to place.
　 Considering informal governance concept, these traditional institutions of governance are working 
in the context of formal governance with modern state structure.  The formal governance uses the 
codified and written law found in constitution and other regulations while informal governance uses 
the uncodified and unwritten law called customary law.  In the informal governance literature, 
customary law falls into the types of informal institutions.  That is why the traditional chieftaincy or 
kingdom can be labeled as ‘Informal institutions.  In addition, there might be some contemporary 
elements that do not come from traditional practices.  In the modern context some practices have 
been brought by the actors, but they do not necessarily come from tradition then in the practice of 
everyday they start practicing them informally.  Indeed, informal governance is probably much 
broader than traditional category.  I think this study can cover both contemporary and traditional 
elements.  Therefore, it will be appropriate to label these forms of governance in villages set up as 
‘Informal Institutions’ rather than ‘Traditional Institutions’.
　 Taking into consideration all definitions from various authors, informal governance or informal 
institution can be defined as rules that are uncodified, unwritten, and locally accepted and enforced 
outside official channels.
4. Conclusion
In this study, the detail discussion of formal and informal governance allowed to grasp the 
impossibility to comprehend one concept without the other.  Informal governance or institutions can 
be illegal or legal, but the main problem resides on the fact that their rules must be accepted by 
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people.  Whether illegal or legitimate, once these rules are accepted by the society they can be 
enforced by the actors.  Talking about the informality of structures and processes, it is important to 
note that this cannot be understood out of the context of formal structures and processes.  In the 
formal institutions, rules are legally instituted and written down to regulate formal social action.  Then, 
formal governance is visible, the structure is fixed, and codified laws are practiced but informal 
governances are invisible but practiced by the people.  Unlike formal rules, informal processes are 
social interaction that occur in the context of formal rule to reach expectations through unwritten 
agreement.  Then, the invisible character of the structure explains the informality of institution.  Being 
invisible, the informal institution can be operational when the law is accepted by the people. 
Governance as process resides in the fact that informality may be illegal or legal, but this difference is 
not a big question.  The point is whether it is locally accepted.  However, in the case of dispute 
resolution, the reference to the non-written agreement in the informal institution to settle the matter 
may become difficult because of non-documented character of the law.  This can be the weakness of 
the unwritten law or agreement.
　 Actors in informal institutions rely much on these informal expectations to plan and coordinate 
their individual and collective action.  When they fall short of expectations, then disappointment and 
confusion can emerge.  This attitude can be considered as weakness because in every enterprise there 
can be a failure due to certain conditions.  Instead of being disappointed or get confused, it would be 
better to look for the reasons that led to failure and correct them to reach the initial goal.
　 Concerning sanctions, formal institutions have legally defined sanctions that correspond to 
committed infractions.  Nevertheless, in the informal institutions, infraction is sanctioned in the form 
of polite disapprobation, social isolation, or physical aggression.  This shows that the sanction 
dependent on those involved in the processes.
　 About the source of informal institutions authorities, it can be understood that several sources have 
been mentioned like social acceptance as source of legitimacy or all other sources like auto-licensing. 
These depend mostly on the outcome of the informal institution’s purpose.  The implication is that in 
the case of negative outcome informal institution can be disapproved.  Then, it becomes a condition to 
fulfill to maintain this legitimacy.
　 In the types of informal institutions, one group can include corruption and clientelism as they are 
abstract and characterized by trust or distrust in the relation between individual actors for their own 
gain.  This group can be considered as one of informal institutions weaknesses due to their tendency 
to work for individual instead of the collective interest.  When they fall short pursuing general interest, 
they prevent state building.  Another group can be constituted of customary law, self-help networks, 
social security where many people in the area expect to gain from these informal institutions.  These 
types are oriented towards problems solving even though they may also create some problems that 
hinder state building.
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Distinction between Formal and Informal Governance:
A Critical Analysis of the Concepts
Georges Bomino BOSAKAIBO
Abstract
　 In the academic arena, governance as concept gain a momentum among various scholars due to the 
role it supposes or plays beyond government.  The governance concept is commonly used in many 
contexts.  However, people are also used to or ignore its counterpart concept of informal governance 
which has also attract some scholars who have interest in its understanding.  This study focuses on 
bringing about the difference between the two concepts in order to clarify what they entail and how they 
operate side by side or demarcate from each other.  The secondary data used is the existing literature 
from books, journals and internet sources.  In fact, it is impossible to understand informal governance 
without grasping the formal governance meaning.  Unlike formal rules, informal processes are social 
interaction that occur in the context of formal rule to reach expectations through unwritten agreement. 
Then, the invisible character of the structure explains the informality of institution.
